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Article 6

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CAROL STEIKER

Welcome to our panel this afternoon. My name is Carol Steiker, and
I am on the faculty at the Harvard Law School. I am a former Public
Defender who teaches and writes in the area of criminal law, criminal
procedure, and capital punishment.
We have a terrific panel. We have Professor Randall Kennedy of the
Harvard Law School, who has just written a well-received and comprehensive book on race, crime, and the law. Professor Kennedy will discuss police stops and the issue of race.
We have also Kim Taylor-Thompson, a Professor of Law at NYU
and formerly at Stanford Law School. Professor Taylor-Thompson was
the Director of the D.C. Public Defenders Service.
Harvey Silverglate is here from the law firm of Silverglate and
Good, one of the best known criminal defense law firms in the country
and now you can even say the world because Mr. Silverglate has just
represented Louise Woodward in the nanny murder case in Massachusetts.'
Professor Kennedy will discuss police stops and the criminal justice
system. Professor Taylor-Thompson will discuss jury voting procedures.
Mr. Silverglate will discuss innocence and the criminal justice system.
When all three have finished speaking, we will open up the floor to
questions and comments. Professor Kennedy.
RANDALL KENNEDY
Thank you very much, Carol. One of the essential tasks of government is to protect citizens against criminality. One of the major impediments to efficient and decent law enforcement is the feeling of resentment, mistrust, cynicism, and antagonism that is felt toward the guardians of law and order in many communities around the nation, particularly
racial minority communities.

1. See Sara Rimer, British Nanny Found Guilty of Murder in Baby's Death, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 31, 1997, at A14 (On October 31, 1997, Louise Woodward, a 19-year-old
nanny from England, was found guilty of second-degree murder in the death an of an
eight-month-old baby boy she was hired to watch.).
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There are many things that feed this feeling of cynicism and mistrust.
The primary element that feeds this cynicism is the use of race in making
determinations of suspicion. Police officers, at the state level and at the
federal level, use this practice as a routine matter. In fact, it is a matter
of policy.
Let me provide a few examples. If you are in the southwestern
United States and you are thirty miles north of the Mexico-United States
border, the United States Border Patrol is on record as having said that it
takes apparent Mexican ancestry into account in making determinations
of suspicion. Therefore, if you are a person of apparent Mexican ancestry, the guardians of law and order, the United States Border Patrol, treat
you differently from other people.
Throughout the United States, black men between the ages of eighteen and forty are dealt with by federal and state officials differently from
other people. Let me try to make this distinction more concrete. Imagine that I fly from Los Angeles to Kansas City, Mo. I get off the plane
and a drug enforcement agency official says he would like to ask me a
few questions and look into my bags. Furthermore, suppose I ask, "Why
me? There are two hundred other people on the plane." Let's suppose
that the official responds, "I am asking you because you were the last
person off the plane."
The question is can blackness serve as a factor of suspicion? The
courts have responded in the affirmative. There are literally hundreds of
cases in which state and federal courts have held that it is proper for police officers to take race into account in making determinations of suspicion. The courts add, however, that it would be improper if race were
being used to harass someone on a racial basis. But race may be used as
one of several factors in constructing a code file leading the police to
think that a person might be more likely to be engaged in criminal misconduct than another person.
The justification for the discrimination is that it is not invidious racial discrimination. Rather, this is a type of reasonable racial discrimination. I believe that a court would say this is no different than the use
of race in other contexts in which race is often used today.
In the affirmative action context, for example, race is a factor in
making a determination with respect to the question of suspicion. The
Federal Judiciary has confirmed this policy as have the United States
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
I think this is an error. The courts ought not to permit the police to
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take race into account in this way. The courts ought to be more exacting.
The courts ought to demand that police can only take race into account if
there is a compelling justification-something akin to an emergency.
Under such circumstances, I can understand the police being able to take
race into account.
But otherwise, on a day-by-day nature, just using race in this sort of
casual, ad hoc way, subjecting the use of race only to a reasonableness
standard, seems to be corrosive.
It is corrosive on a variety of dimensions. First, it opens the door to
the invidious use of race. I have been assuming, however, that the police
officer acts in good faith. In contrast, there are a substantial number of
"Mark Furhmans" in police uniforms as well. If we allow merely a reasonable test, we open up the door to the invidious use of race by the
Mark Furhmans of the world.
Furthermore, even with respect to the good faith officers, if we allow
officers to take race into account in making determinations of suspicion,
we create a bad incentive structure.
After all, if I am thinking about where I am going to live, and the
police are able to take race into account, the police are able, legally, to
view a black person living in a predominantly white neighborhood as a
suspicious person.
Who would want to live in a place where they are going to be viewed
as different and incongruous, and therefore suspicious.
Finally, let me give just one last argument for why we, as citizens,
should demand that the judiciary be more exacting than it is. We are the
inheritors of a society that inculcates racial thinking as a matter of reflex
or habit. As a society we should do all that we can to try to uproot this
reflex. Unfortunately the current regime under which we allow race to
be used as a factor of suspicion only nurtures this reflex.
I look forward to your questions and comments after my colleagues
have had a chance to speak. Thank you.
KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON
I am pleased to hear Professor Kennedy acknowledge the role that
race plays in our law enforcement decisions. Far too frequently, scholars, courts, and popular writers examining the criminal justice system
advance the opposing position-that race has little significance in our
law enforcement and judicial efforts. Such a conclusion strikes me as
peculiar. I have engaged in careful study of the criminal justice process
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both as a public defender for ten years in Washington, D.C., and since
then, as a law teacher, and one cannot help but notice the strong interplay
of race and decision making in the system. Whether one examines the
exercise of discretion that triggers the initiation of the criminal justice
process or decision making that occurs throughout the prosecution of a
criminal case, race centrally affects perceptions and skews outcomes in
this system.
Of course, some scholars almost reflexively advance the normative
proposition that race should play no role in the criminal justice process.
No one of good conscience would disagree with that goal. But the selfcongratulatory impulses that lead some to proclaim that we as a society
have reached the place where race can be set aside seem somewhat premature. We cannot ignore the extent to which racial dynamics currently
influence and infect every aspect of the criminal justice system. Still,
many insist that actors within the system, left on their own, will rise to
the occasion and engage in color-blind decision making. This seems, at
best, naive given the current operation of the system. At worst, it seems
dangerously complacent. The consistent complexion of those individuals
who populate our courts, jails, and prisons should cause us, at a minimum, to suspect the influence of race. The disquieting narratives from
people of color-and particularly men of color--chronicling detentions
by the police for the de facto offense of "driving while black" necessarily
cast doubt on claims of race neutrality by law enforcement officials.
And the ever increasing number of men of color under the control of the
criminal justice system compels us to discover and correct the ways in
which racial dynamics disproportionately expose certain communities to
the criminal justice system.
Statistics begin to tell this story. Take, for example, the evidence of
drug usage in this country. The FBI reports that approximately eighty
percent of those individuals who use drugs are white;2 twelve percent are
African 3American; and eight percent fall into that tidy category of
"other." Notwithstanding these figures, in criminal courts across the
country, these percentages are reversed. The overwhelming majority of

2. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 269-72 (Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Ctr. ed.,
1997).
3.

See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
1996, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1997).

CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES,
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individuals charged with drug crimes are people of color. 4 Similar racial
patterns emerge when we narrow our focus to a single state. In California, for example, in six out of every ten times a woman is raped or a person is assaulted or robbed, the offender is white. 5 But the vast majority
of individuals charged with and ultimately punished for violent crimes in
California are people of color.6 These numbers suggest that the influence
of race cannot be so easily dismissed. If we are at all serious about
boldly tackling the challenges of the criminal justice system, the impact
of race must top the list. Still, the breadth of this task could conceivably
overwhelm us.
Let me propose a starting point for our efforts-jury trials. Currently, the choice to proceed to trial raises a unique set of issues for the
accused person of color. Principal among them is whether she can expect-and then counteract-jurors' racial biases? Because courts routinely restrict lawyers' efforts to conduct meaningful voir dire, lawyers
face considerable obstacles in unearthing prejudices influencing jurors'
perceptions. Worse still, many scholars and courts are urging either
drastic reductions in the number of peremptory challenges or their outright elimination. Removing those jurors who might harbor extreme
views, preventing them from fairly evaluating the evidence, becomes all
the more difficult.
Just as troubling, defendants of color may find it virtually impossible
to seat jurors of color on the jury. Reports in the media and ensuing debates in courtrooms reveal a mounting suspicion of jurors of color. By
now the lines are familiar. Jurors of color can't judge a case fairly when
the defendant is a person of color, some argue. Or, jurors of color seem
unduly swayed by passion. As fears of racial nullification 7 seep into the
4. See Jennifer Gonnerman, PrisonerPolitics, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), Sept. 29,
1998, at 51 ("Studies indicate that although the rate of illicit drug use among white people is actually greater than among black people, black people are arrested and convicted
on drug charges far more frequently.").
5. See, e.g., Justice Department Finds Some Common Characteristicsin Offenders, FRESNO BEE (Cal.), Feb. 3, 1997, at A6 (finding that sex offenders are more likely to
be white than are other violent offenders).
6. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at
269-72; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 3.

7. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (suggesting that black jurors may have a moral obligation to nullify in non-violent drug cases given that a disproportionate number of young
men of color have come under the supervision of the criminal justice system for these
offenses).
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deliberation room, a disturbing erosion of the effectiveness of these jurors may follow. If fellow jurors dismiss as nullification genuine concems raised by jurors of color about the evidence, jurors of color may
lose persuasive power in that process.8 Indeed, this corrosive cynicism
about jurors of color may effectively eliminate the possibility that the
accused person of color will be able to locate her voice in the deliberation room.
And still there is more. A less obvious-but equally disturbingthreat exists for defendants of color in this system: the call to replace the
unanimous verdict with non-unanimous voting requirements. Such a
move could have serious implications for the voting power of those people of color who actually serve on criminal trial juries. Research conducted in the past two decades examining the impact of the decisionmaking rule has found that non-unanimous voting discourages examination of opposing viewpoints. Eliminating the need to secure each person's agreement on the verdict removes the incentive to engage in wideranging discussions involving the entire jury.
Interestingly, an examination of the history of the jury system in this
country reveals that unanimity and juries have been inexorably linked.
In an almost unbroken line of cases, the United States Supreme Court
accepted unanimity as an essential feature of jury trials. 9 But in an
abrupt departure from that tradition, the Supreme Court concluded in a
pair of decisions in 1972 that the standard of unanimity was not constitutionally mandated. 10 The states were free to experiment with nonunanimous verdicts in criminal cases."1 Justice Brennan dissented from
8. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing the trial
judge's dismissal of a black juror in a drug conspiracy case in which all of the defendants
were black. During deliberations, two jurors indicated to the clerk that deliberations
would take a long time because the black juror was voting not guilty and refusing to
change his mind. Another juror sent a note to the trial judge complaining that because of
the black juror's "predisposition," the jury would be unable to reach a verdict. On appeal, the court found that the dismissal of the juror was unwarranted and cautioned the
trial court against delving too deeply into juror's motivations and intruding on the secrecy
of the deliberations.).
9. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740,748 (1948); Patton v. United States,
281 U.S. 276 (1930); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 355 (1898).
10. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404,408 (1972).
11. See id.; see generally REID HAsTiE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (discussing
the differences in behavior of unanimous and majority juries based on a variety of statistical and social studies).
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these decisions. Unanimity had always operated to ensure substantial
participation by all groups in the jury, he reminded us. He and his fellow
dissenters warned that majority rule in this context could marginalize
minority views.
This warning proved prophetic. In the two decades since the Court's
rulings, researchers have undertaken a careful examination of the impact
of the rule that governs jury decision making on deliberations. First, they
found that majority rule raises serious question about the jury's error
rate: majority rule juries tend to reach erroneous verdicts. Second, they
discovered that the decision-making rule affected the quality of deliberations. Under a non-unanimous voting scheme, juries tend to be verdict
driven. Jurors spend less time deliberating and debating issues and more
time trying to reach the necessary number to return a verdict. As a result,
majority rule juries deliberate only long enough to deliver a verdict. In
contrast, researchers found that juries governed by a unanimity standard
were evidence driven. They expressed more opinions, exchanged more
information, disagreed more, and included more minority opinions during deliberations than their majority rule counterparts. In juries governed
by a unanimous standard, the point at which the group reached a majority
view proved pivotal. Not only did deliberations continue, but also
twenty-seven percent of the requests for additional instructions, twentyfive percent of the oral corrections of errors, and
thirty-four percent of
12
occurred.
proof
of
standard
the
of
the discussion
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of majority rule decision making
is its ability to silence the voice of difference on the jury. Majority rule
sends a clear signal to jurors that they need not make the effort or the
arguments to reach beyond group loyalties to build consensus. A close
examination of the representation of people of color on juries reveals that
they tend to comprise the numerical minority. If their views place them
outside of the majority mainstream, they can simply be outvoted and ignored on a jury where majority rule governs. Instead of operating as a
group that derives information from a variety of sources, the jury could
return a verdict without ever acknowledging or confronting gaps in its
interpretation of evidence. But does this present a real problem? Do
jurors of color bring perspectives that are unique?
Broadly speaking, they do. More than any other characteristic, race
carries with it a socializing history. It defines and delineates our experi-

12. See generally HASTIE

ET AL.,

supra note 11.
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ences and perceptions, with resulting differences in opportunities and
world views. Mock jury studies have largely confirmed this proposition
by demonstrating that jurors of color bring distinctive experiences into
the group. These jurors may also prod otherwise all-white juries to confront commonly held assumptions and to approach evidence from a different analytical perspective.
A quick example should illustrate this point. Studies and polls reveal3
that attitudes about police officers tend to diverge along racial lines.'
Despite jury instructions that direct jurors to treat police officers as they
would any other witness, white jurors tend to credit police officers' testimony while jurors of color often approach that testimony with skepticism or even mistrust. Without this critical perspective, an officer's testimony might escape the depth of analysis that juries generally apply to
the testimony of non-law enforcement witnesses.
In the end, race has wide-ranging impact in the current criminal justice system. As we approach the millennium, our task will involve developing methods to acknowledge this influence and to develop a system
that fairly tackles the problem of crime in ways that do not disproportionately disadvantage individuals or groups based on their race.
CAROL STEIKER

Thank you. Mr. Silverglate.
HARVEY SILVERGLATE

I am going to take advantage of this opportunity to make a few observations that are a product of my thirty years of experience in criminal
defense work. My observations are not aimed directly at race. Nonetheless it has been my experience that any problem in the system, anything that is done that enhances the opportunities and the chances for
innocent people to be convicted, disproportionally impacts minority
members. Consequently, we all have this problem. Some, however, are
less equal than others in being impacted by this problem.
I have always viewed the equal application of the law to be the single
most important value that we should strive for. It is also the single value
that we have failed most miserably at. Bear in mind that this is a problem that affects everybody.
If I could have one reform in the system that would best reduce the
13.

See generally id.

1999]

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

number of erroneous convictions, I would have a rule that no confessions
and no admissions should be admissible at a criminal trial unless tape
recorded or videotaped. Why do I say that?
In the Ramzi Ahmed Yousef case involving the Trade Center
bombing, probably the single most important piece of evidence against
the defendant, who was not an American, was the testimony of a Secret
Service agent. The New York Times reported the following:
Building on evidence used in the previous terrorism trials,
prosecutors were able to augment their case against Mr.
Yousef with crucial new testimony. A United States Secret
Service agent, Brian G. Parr, told jurors that Mr. Yousef
gave a detailed account of his role in the bomb plot, even
bragging about it, while being flown back to the United
States after his arrest in Pakistan in 1995.14
This was then argued very heavily by the prosecutors in the summation to the jury. All the defense lawyers could do was question the agent
as to why he did not tape record the statements. (By the way, they rarely

do.)
There is actually a policy and practice of FBI agents, for example,
that when an agent interviews somebody who pulls out a tape recorder,
the agent leaves. Instead, the agent show up with a second agent to have
a witness as to what was said.
I have inquired of agents for many years as to why they have this
rule. The question remains unanswered. I have my own view on it.
They do not really want to have an accurate, verbatim account of what
you said. Instead, they spin it. You have one agent doing the questioning and the other one taking notes. Why it is that an agent taking notes is
viewed as the equivalent of a tape recorder for purposes of accuracy, I
will never understand.
This same technique was used in the Terry Nichols case where he
supposedly admitted to an FBI agent that he and McVeigh actually discussed doing a bombing. This admission was during a nine-hour interrogation. The only thing that the defense counsel could do was attack the
agent's spotty notes. These notes are always spotty because the agents
14. Benjamin Weiser, The Trade Center Verdict: The Overview; "Mastermind"
and Driver Found Guilty in 1993 Plot to Blow Up Trade Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,

1997, at Al.
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write the things they want to hear and not necessarily everything that
they actually hear.
Perhaps the single most damaging piece of evidence in the Louise
Woodward case was the testimony of a single Newton Police detective
recounting his interview with Ms. Woodward and all kinds of admissions
she supposedly made about treating the child rough, popping him onto
the floor, and things of that nature. What was interesting about the detective's testimony was that the night he interviewed her he had another
officer taking notes. He admitted that they had tape recorders at the
Newton Police Station, but he did not bring one to the interview. He
knew he was coming to talk to Ms. Woodward, yet he did not bring a
tape recorder.
He then wrote up a report. The report did not contain a single word
that would be incriminating. The next day he spoke to a couple of the
people at Children's Hospital who came up with this completely hokey
theory that the medical evidence showed that this child was shaken and
then struck. As soon as he heard that account, he had a different memory
of what Ms. Woodward had said the day before. It is just another example of how everybody is impacted by this pernicious practice of allowing
confessions and admissions in evidence where there are no tape recordings. By the way, I would not even be satisfied with having a defendant
sign a statement, because it is easy to coerce someone into signing
something. Nothing short of audio tape or videotape should be used.
The pernicious practice of not allowing, much less requiring, recording
of a statement should be reversed by legislation if the FBI will not do it
voluntarily.
Along these same lines, I would not accept a waiver of Miranda
rights or any other right unless it is in writing or unless it is videotaped. I
prefer the tape to the writing for the reason just stated.
Unfortunately this is not the direction in which the law is going. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1996 was faced with this
question and held it would not prescribe a rule of general "superintendence or common law suppressing statements taken from a defendant in
station unless those statements have been electronicustody in a police
15
recorded.
cally
We have a long way to go in educating people in the legal system
about this problem. Quickly, I would like to mention some other reforms

15.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Mass. 1996).
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that I think would reduce the number of convictions of innocent people.
First, the use of jailhouse and other vulnerable informants and witnesses to testify is problematic. This is one reason why it is so important
to bail clients out of jail when they are arrested. Any prisoner willing to
so testify immediately gets favors from the authorities. This kind of testimony is always used in close cases where it will make a difference. In
the Woodward case, prosecutors had two prisoners lined up to testify to
her "confession."
This problem impacts black people and poor people disproportionally, because few, on the whole, make bail. The longer you are in prison
pre-trial, the more opportunity there is for the authorities to come up with
this totally concocted jailhouse informant testimony that we see in more
trials than I would care to admit.
Second, another problem in the system is the government's monopoly on crime-scene evidence. It is the reason that forensic evidence in
our system is so unreliable, yet it should be the most reliable. Forensic
evidence is very unreliable because the police have monopolistic control
of the crime scene. All kinds of problems arise from that control. Evidence is destroyed, corrupted, and planted. One of the reforms that we
need is to have a more neutral authority. In the Woodward trial we were
denied the right to attend or do an autopsy.
As a result, the skull, which was the most potent evidence because
the prosecution alleged homicide by skull fracture, was never tested by a
pathologist. Giving the State a monopoly over crime scene evidence is
the kind of practice we must reform.
Third, and this is a huge topic worthy of an entire conference of its
own, are the limitations on habeas corpus. While the other categories
that I just discussed have been responsible for putting an enormous number of innocent people in prison, the limitations on habeas corpus have
been responsible for keeping them there. The system has figured out a
way at long last to avoid the embarrassment of the frequent discoveries
that we have had for decades-we have convicted innocent people and
have even put innocent people on death row.
Instead of reforming the system to reduce the number of erroneous
convictions, the courts, and now Congress, have figured out a way to
hide their mistakes from public attention. Procedurally, they have cut off
review of cases that otherwise would embarrass them because of the
number of erroneous cases. When habeas was still alive, there was a
steady stream of cases in which it was discovered that people had been in
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prison for five, ten, and twenty years-people had been on death row but
hadn't been executed yet who were suddenly discovered to be innocent.
The system is trying to avoid embarrassment, not by correcting its
errors, but by effectively hiding them. This is a scandal, and the Supreme Court has not only allowed it to happen but also has actually led
the way. It is a disgrace.
CAROL STEIKER

Thank you, Harvey Silverglate. I would like to give the panelists a
chance to respond to anything that they might have heard.
RANDALL KENNEDY

I would like to respond to Harvey Silverglate's comments. I also deplore the narrowing of habeas corpus relief and many of the things that
you discussed.
But I must admit that your comments probably have pushed me in
precisely the opposite direction than I think you intended your comments
to push people. The subject of our panel, Contemporary Challenges in
the Criminal Justice System, like so many subjects, is part of a larger
cultural conflict in American society. One of the things that has led to
popular mobilization against the legacy of Brennan, Marshall, and other
liberals within the judicial system, has to do with the problems with the
comments that you just made.
Let me just make two comments, and I would be interested in your
reactions. One, you ended your comments by talking about an enormous
number of innocent persons in prisons. I would doubt very seriously that
that is the case.
Are there innocent people who have been convicted erroneously?
Yes. It is also undoubtedly true that there have been innocent people
who have ended up on death row. Every year there are a couple of people who walk off of death rows because a mistake has been made. Regardless, the argument that there are enormous numbers of innocent persons in prison seems to be just an exaggeration that undercuts the persuasiveness of your position.
With respect to the question of the description of the enforcers of law
and order, there has been this notion of nefarious motives-police officers want to lock up people sort of willy-nilly. I do not think this assessment is accurate. Even worse, it seems politically counterproductive.
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HARVEY SILVERGLATE

May I respond?
CAROL STEIKER

You have twenty seconds.
HARVEY SILVERGLATE

Part of the difference between us perhaps comes from our different
experiences. I have a different professional role from you, and I come
across these situations with some regularity.
I started out by saying that in my view these techniques accounted
for a majority of the convictions of innocent persons. I did not say
enormous.
When I became more heated up, then I said enormous. To me, having five percent of the prison population innocent is enormous. These
techniques make a conviction so unreliable that we do not know if the
person is innocent or guilty.
I have seen many people go to prison in my law practice who I really
thought probably were not guilty. I have actually seen a few go to prison
who I knew were innocent.
When you have unreliable techniques, when you allow police officers to testify to confessions that they could have recorded but did not,
that is an unreliable piece of testimony.
On your number two point, I feel even stronger. In a system like
ours, which is an adversary system, adversaries get very adversarial.
Police officers prefer putting guilty people away, but they prefer solving
crimes. In addition, I admit that not all of the techniques are done in bad
faith.
For example, in the Woodward case, it is not clear to me that the officer thought he was fabricating Ms. Woodward's admission. The doctors at Children's Hospital told the officer she obviously did it. As a result, the officer reflects back on his interview with Ms. Woodward and
remembers it differently than it really happened.
If the officer had a tape recording, this problem of fallible memory
would not be such a problem. Accordingly, I am not suggesting that
there was necessarily bad faith. Instead, I am talking about bad procedures that lead to erroneous convictions.
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KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON

Let me take two seconds, Carol, if I may. Responding to Randy's
reaction to the statement that an "enormous number of innocent people
[are] in prisons," I find your comments troubling. You agree that "a
couple of people walk off of death row every year" but, in your view,
that does not seem an enormous number. I must agree with Harvey that
a couple is a lot. With the cutbacks on habeas, we may never know how
many other people should have been walking off death row but now will
be executed without an in-depth review of their record. A few years ago,
a study reported in the Stanford Law Review documented the number of
innocent people that were on death row.16 Those numbers, even then,
were rather large.
I also would like to address the notion that police officers may have
nefarious motives. I do not think that most police officers are attempting
to arrest people just for the sake of locking them up. But we cannot ignore the pressures that police officers feel-particularly when they believe that the person is guilty-to shape the information they provide.
Perhaps they will not manufacture evidence but may instead remember it
differently.
In my practice, I witnessed police officers on a number of occasions
stretching the truth. Officers often admitted under cross examination that
they must have been "mistaken." Given even this limited empirical data,
I do not think that it is such a stretch to suggest that there may be other
motives operating when police officers say that they have certain information when in fact they may not.
CAROL STEIKER

I am going to open the floor for discussion.
AUDIENCE MEMBER ONE

Does our constitutional system inherently protect racial issues?
RANDALL KENNEDY

I will work backwards. No, I do not distinguish it. We have a con16. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988) (discussing a study

revealing that 350 persons have been wrongly convicted of a capital, or potentially capital, crime in the United States).
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stitutional system, and this system should apply. As things currently
stand, what is remarkable is that we have a constitutional system that has
become increasingly impatient with racial distinctions. The Supreme
Court in the last ten years has invalidated any number of affirmative action plans and districting, becoming ever more skeptical of the use of
race as a factor in those contexts.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has been silent with respect to
the use of race in making determinations of suspicion by the police. That
results in tremendous tension within our system, and people have not
been paying enough attention to it.
All racial distinctions should be presumptively invalid unless there is
an absolutely compelling justification to permit the racial distinction.
This is true for both a criminal and civil context.
Again, racial discriminations are presumptively invalid. I think that
is probably a good statement of the law except with respect to the way in
which it is handled in the policing context in which courts become more
accepting of the race line.
I would agree completely with you that our legal system does a miserable job of policing the police. People who think of themselves as conservatives should be very concerned about this.
People who think of themselves as conservatives think, for instance,
that we have to be watchful of governmental bureaucrats, because people
with governmental power tend to abuse their power. That is absolutely
right.
Therefore, we should be much more watchful of the police. After
all, on a day-to-day level, what government bureaucrats have more
power over the everyday citizenry than the police? Yet our governmental system does a terrible job of policing the police.
Similarly, political conservatives have emphasized over and over
again that they want a legal system that deals with everybody the same
regardless of race. If you want a legal system that treats everybody the
same regardless of race, you should be against allowing police officers to
take race into account in making determinations of suspicion.
CAROL STEIKER
Yes?
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AUDIENCE MEMBER TWO
Are there instances where the Court finds it acceptable to consider
racial differences?
RANDALL KENNEDY

There are thousands. Yes. I will just give you two examples of how
this comes up. Imagine it is eleven o'clock at night. It is a predominantly white neighborhood. I am in a car, and a police officer approaches me and handles me differently from a white person.
Can the police officer deal with me differently? Answer, yes. The
courts say he cannot harass me, but is it justifiable for the police officer
to view me differently, given the demographics of the neighborhood and
given my race. It is an incongruity case.
Similarly, with respect to black profiles throughout the United States,
there are literally hundreds of cases in which the Federal Drug Enforcement officials and other local officials take race into account. When they
are confronted to justify the use of race, they refer to the demographics
of drug traffic in this jurisdiction.
There is an empirical reason to believe that there is a slightly increased risk of criminal misdoing on the part of a black male between the
ages of eighteen and forty. The courts have allowed that.
KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON

The Supreme Court has ruled that race cannot be the sole factor that
a police officer considers, but it certainly can be a factor.
CAROL STEIKER

Yes?
AUDIENCE MEMBER THREE
Do you think that the increased power of prosecutors and decreased
discretion of judges in sentencing result in increased numbers of failures
of justice?
HARVEY SILVERGLATE

Certainly the increase in mandatory minimum sentences has long
been an aid to prosecutors being able to exercise the kind of discretion
that previously judges and sometimes juries have exercised. The Federal
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Sentencing Guidelines have made it even worse. The guidelines have
institutionalized this problem. Prosecutors have virtually unreviewable
control over the sentencing process. You really cannot get a break under
the guidelines unless you provide cooperation.
What is most outrageous about this is that the decision as to whether
or not you have cooperated is left up to the prosecutors.
I am not trying to be politic on this panel. When I argue before an
appellate court I have to be politic and not say everything I believe. In
contrast, I believe I have a little bit more liberty today to let it all hang
out.
The problem that you have under the sentencing guidelines is that the
prosecutor decides whether the cooperation is genuine.
The Starr grand jury investigation, down in Washington, has provided a tremendous civics lesson for us all, because we are beginning to
understand how this system really works.
Enormous pressure is put on people to get them to-in Alan Dershowitz's immortal phrase-not only sing, but to compose. You have to
compose frequently to get a sentencing break under the federal guidelines.
CAROL STEIKER
In response to the question, I think there are actually two reforms regarding prosecutorial discretion that would actually go a long way. One,
there is a recent case from the Supreme Court about what defendants
have to show to get discovery from a prosecutor's office to make out a
case of discriminatory prosecution-what is called selective prosecution.
There is a case from the West Coast in which the Northwest Federal
Defenders' Office brought a federal case on behalf of their black clients
who were charged with drug trafficking. The federal defender emphasized that every single one of the drug defendants has been black, yet
there are a lot of white people being prosecuted for drug trafficking in
state courts because the State has concurrent jurisdiction over the same
kinds of drug offenses. And the federal prosecutors get to pick which
people to prosecute under the particularly Draconian federal drug laws.
The federal defender said, look, we think race is playing a factor here
because everyone we represent is black, and there are many white defendants in state court.
The Supreme Court said essentially you have to show us particular
white people who are similarly situated to your black defendants to even
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get discovery.' 7 That is very hard to do. Justice Stevens' eloquent dissent said we ought to let people ask the prosecutors for their reasoning on
some of the gross disparate impact kind of evidence, without requiring
the specific18 showing that is almost impossible to make before you get the
discovery.
This was not enough of a showing to win the case. This was just
enough to have the prosecutors reveal something of the black box of their
decision making. So it seems to me that was one opportunity lost for the
Supreme Court to pierce the veil of prosecutorial secrecy in decision
making.
The other reform that is long overdue involves the grand jury. The
grand jury is a powerful tool of oppression, thought at one time to be a
bulwark between the citizen and the state.
Prosecutors have incredible control over grand juries and can use it
to hail people into court in total secrecy with no adversarial proceedings.
The grand jury is thought to be an independent agent from the prosecutor.
AUDIENCE MEMBER FOUR

Are there coercive techniques employed, that although legal, might
be considered unjust?
CAROL STEIKER

There are many effective techniques that are perfectly legal for the
police to impose that the police fear juries would not like. For example,
there is the famous scenario in which the police say they found your fingerprints at the scene of the crime, but the fingerprints are not the defendant's. It turns out to be a complete lie. Another example is the famous
Xerox machine used deceptively as a lie detector.
In Miranda, the Court cites long excerpts from police manuals on
how to get people to confess and all the lies you should tell them and
ways you can falsely win their trust.' 9 I think the police believe that the
statements they get are reliable, but they fear that a perfectly reliable
statement that can be corroborated will be disregarded because of the
methods employed.
17.
18.
19.

See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,470 (1996).
See id. at 476-83.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,448-49 (1966).
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AUDIENCE MEMBER FIVE

So whose actions are more destructive on society: the corrupt officer
or the self-righteous one?
RANDALL KENNEDY

Something that we have to fear much more than the idea of the bad
faith officer is the officer who in good faith thinks that he has a murderer
or an arsonist in his clutches, and therefore wants to put this person behind bars. The good faith officer therefore righteously feels justified in
supplying false evidence, because it is on behalf of a good cause. I think
the use of race in making determinations of suspicion facilitates this selfhelp attitude of the police.
Similarly, the lawyers who deploy racially discriminatory peremptory challenges often are not people who are bigots. Rather, they are defense attorneys who want to do the best they can by their client. Or they
are prosecutors who think that they have a guilty person and they want to
put the person behind bars. Even though it has been rejected as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, they will do it.
I think that a whole new species of racial discrimination, motivated
by people who are attempting to effectuate ends that are not related to
racial oppression, is emerging. These people see racial discrimination as
a means to a good end. I think that is a very important problem and one
that must be addressed.
KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON
I did not mean to suggest that the police officer necessarily reaches
those ends based on good faith. There certainly are police officers who,
based on stereotypical assumptions, develop an "us against them" philosophy. They believe that they have conducted the appropriate amount
of investigation, and they now want to convict the person whom they
have arrested. This does not seem to be a good faith effort. Rather, it is
-'a bad faith effort. Regardless of where you fall on the good faith/bad
faith spectrum, the problem still remains that information offered against
a defendant is not always accurate.
There is no justification for a police officer's decision not to record a
statement. Perhaps they do not want to show what they actually do and
what the law actually permits them to do, because it may adversely impact a factfinder's decision to convict. But I cannot think of a plausible
reason for failing to record statements.
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CAROL STEIKER

A couple more questions. Yes?
AUDIENCE MEMBER SIX

How has the media affected the public's perception of crime? And
what can be done to ensure that the wrong perception is not being reinforced?
KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON
One of the problems that public defenders face is that they have allowed the media to discuss crime in a way that instills genuine fear in the
general public. So the public understandably believes that it must incarcerate large numbers of individuals to guarantee some level of safety in
their communities. Defenders need to take back this agenda, to get back
in front of cameras, and to reeducate the public.
This sort of advocacy must increasingly become part of the defenders' job. Often, chief public defenders duck the media, partly because
their offices are often representing the individuals whom everyone fears.
Traditionally, defenders' response has been to make no comment and
hope that they can quietly obtain a favorable result.
This is the wrong reaction. We need to address communities to present them with another perspective, rather than just the perspective of police officers and prosecutors.
RANDALL KENNEDY

One thing that needs to be voiced is the idea that crime is a type of
oppression.
KIM TAYLOR-THOMPSON

There is no question that you cannot walk into a community and announce that crime does not exist. But friends and family members all too
often have assumed different roles in the criminal justice system. One
day they may be the victims of crime, but the next day they may be the
accused. This potential role reversal is something that often does not get
discussed in communities. As people of color, we quite clearly recognize that we are often victimized. But we tend simultaneously to hold
the view that the way the criminal law operates is too strict and much too
Draconian.
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HARVEY SILVERGLATE

We have to make the point that techniques that produce unreliable
evidence do not make the streets safer.
CAROL STEIKER

I have very few duties as moderator but one is to end on time. I
thank you all for coming.

